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THE PLIGHT OF THE PATAGONIAN 
TOOTHFISH:  LESSONS FROM THE 
VOLGA CASE  
I. INTRODUCTION 
arnings from policy makers, scientists, fishing commu-
nities, and environmental groups have recently in-
creased in pitch: the oceans once thought to contain limitless, 
renewable bounties of fish are, in fact, in a state of crisis.1   Evi-
dence of the widespread dwindling and collapsing of fish popu-
lations is dangerous to ignore.2  One source estimates that 70 
percent of the world’s commercial fisheries have been fully ex-
ploited, overexploited, or depleted.3  Although various factors 
contribute to the depletion of the oceans’ fish, such as pollution, 
climate change, and mistaken understandings of marine ecosys-
tems, overfishing by human beings is a major cause of fish de-
population.4  Certain species are dangerously overfished, in 
  
 1. See generally William J. Broad & Andrew C. Revkin, Has the Sea Given 
Up Its Bounty?: Overfishing Imposes a Heavy Toll,  N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, 
at F1 (Science Times); SYLVIA A. EARLE, SEA CHANGE: A MESSAGE OF THE 
OCEANS (1995) 168–97; PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: 
CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE—A REPORT TO THE NATION: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW OCEAN POLICY, 35–48 (May 2003), available at 
http://www.pewoceans.org/; Ambassador Mary Beth West, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries, Statement before the Subcommit-
tee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans, House Committee on 
Resources, U.S. Dep’t St., Promoting Sustainable International Fisheries 
Worldwide, May 22, 2003 [hereinafter Dep’t St. Oceans and Fisheries], avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2003/20952pf.htm.  
 2. See EARLE, supra note 1, at 169 (“[T]he ocean cannot sustain the mas-
sive removal of wildlife needed to keep Japan and other nations supplied with 
present levels of food taken from the sea.”); PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 
1, at 73 (“[D]emand for seafood is rising, yet the total global wild fisheries 
catch has leveled out since the mid-1990s as fish stocks have become depleted. 
In the U.S., 30 percent of the known wild fishery stocks are already overfished 
or in the process of being depleted through overfishing.”); Dep’t St. Oceans 
and Fisheries, supra note 1 (“Many of the world’s primary fishery resources 
are under stress.  A number of key fish stocks have collapsed from overfishing 
and environmental degradation . . . while others have become depleted.”). 
 3. Broad & Revkin, supra note 1.  
 4. Press Release, “Who Plays by the Fisheries Rules?”—Commission 
Launches Public Compliance Scoreboard on the Internet, European Commis-
sion Press Room, IP/03/841, at 1 (June 16, 2003) [hereinafter Who Plays by the 
 
W 
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large part due to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing 
(IUU fishing).5  IUU fishing can have a devastating impact on 
already-fragile fish populations; it can cause the collapse of a 
fishery, or significantly undermine efforts to rebuild depleted 
stocks.6  Patagonian toothfish (toothfish), commonly known in 
the United States as Chilean sea bass, are threatened by ram-
  
Fisheries Rules?], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news_corn 
er/press/inf03_22_en.htm.   
  Overfishing occurs when “fish are killed faster than they can repro-
duce….”  Tim Eichenberg & Mitchell Shapson, The Promise of Johannesburg: 
Fisheries and the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 34 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 587, 596 (2004).  In the opinion of nineteen prominent scien-
tists, “ecological extinction caused by overfishing preceded all other human 
disturbance to coastal ecosystems, including pollution, degradation of water 
quality, and anthropogenic climate change.”  Id.  In 2003, the European 
Commission observed that 76% of all fisheries-related infringement proce-
dures brought against member states could be attributed to overfishing claims 
in contravention of fisheries obligations, despite the imminent collapse of cer-
tain fish stocks.  Who Plays by the Fisheries Rules?, supra.  
 5. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions (“FAO”), the term “IUU fishing” describes various activities: 
Some IUU fishers operate in areas where fishing is not permitted.  
Some employ banned technologies, outlawed net types, or flaunt fish-
ing regulations in other ways.  Others under-report how big their 
catches are—or don’t report them at all.  In some cases, in fact, 
catches of commercially-valuable fish species may be surpassing 
permitted levels by over 300 percent due to IUU fishing . . . . 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Calls for In-
tensified Action to Combat Illegal Fishing, FAO Newsroom, Dec. 3, 2003 [here-
inafter FAO Newsroom], available at http://www.fao.org/english/newroom/ 
news/2003/25379-en.html.               
 6. International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, para. 1, June 23, 2001 [hereinafter IPOA-IUU], available 
at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm.  A recent U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly resolution echoed this concern: 
Concerned that illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing threatens 
seriously to deplete populations of certain fish species and signifi-
cantly damage marine ecosystems and that illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing has a detrimental impact on sustainable fisher-
ies, including the food security and the economies of many States . . . . 
G.A. Res. 142, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/142 (2003), 
available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/547/60/PDF/N02 
54760.pdf?OpenElement.  See also FAO Newsroom, supra note 5 (“In some 
cases, in fact, catches of commercially-valuable fish species may be surpassing 
permitted levels by over 300 percent due to IUU fishing. . . .”).   
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pant IUU fishing.7  Several international and regional organiza-
tions regulate IUU fishing in regions where toothfish poaching 
occurs.  Unfortunately, enforcement problems encumber con-
servation measures established under these instruments, mak-
ing it difficult to stop IUU fishing. 
The primary international instrument governing the law of 
the sea, including the conservation of living marine resources, is 
the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS or Convention),8 which was adopted in 1982 and en-
tered into force in 1994.9  UNCLOS is a vital instrument with 
strong conservationist goals.10  It is therefore lamentable that 
the tribunal established under UNCLOS to hear fishing dis-
putes has given insufficient consideration to these fundamental 
conservationist objectives.  In a series of judgments ending with 
the Volga case,11 the International Tribunal of the Law of the 
Sea (Tribunal or ITLOS)12 narrowly interpreted key UNCLOS 
  
 7. See generally TRAFFIC Lauds Detention of Suspected ‘Pirate’ Toothfish 
Fishing Vessel, but the Chase Must Continue: Greater International Coopera-
tion Needed in Addressing Illegal Fisheries, TRAFFIC Network, Aug. 28, 
2003, available at http://www.traffic.org/news/pirate_toothfish.html (“Patago-
nian Toothfish is highly valued in restaurants in Japan and the USA . . . , 
which are the largest consumer markets for Patagonian Toothfish, followed by 
Canada and the EU …. TRAFFIC studies revealed that IUU catch may ac-
count for half of all Patagonian Toothfish traded internationally . . . .”). 
 8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://www.un.org.Depts/ 
los/convention_agreemetns/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. One author describes 
UNCLOS as the “constitution of the oceans.”  Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, World 
Ocean Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries After Grotius—Towards a New Ocean 
Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 645, 671 (2004).     
 9. The Oceans Are the Very Foundation of Human Life, UNCLOS website, 
at http://www.un.org/depts/los/oceans_foundation.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 
2004).     
 10. The Convention’s preamble conveys the intention of member states to 
“promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient 
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and 
the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment. . . .”  
UNCLOS, supra note 8, at 25 (preamble) [hereinafter UNCLOS Preamble].   
 11. The “Volga” Case (Russian Fed’n v. Australia), ITLOS Case No. 11 
(2002), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2004). 
 12. ITLOS is “an independent judicial body established by the Convention 
to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the 
Convention.”  General Information—Overview, International Tribunal for the 
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enforcement and dispute resolution provisions.  This restrictive 
interpretation created an additional obstacle for coastal states13 
seeking to deter and punish IUU fishing inside their national 
waters.  The negative impact of these judgments is twofold: 
first, they diminish an individual state’s power to punish and 
deter IUU fishing within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).14  
Second, the judgments interfere with regional organizations’ 
efforts to deter IUU fishing in defined areas.  The Commission 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) is a regional organization that regulates toothfish 
harvesting in the Antarctic waters.15  Although UNCLOS 
strongly encourages regional cooperation among its members to 
conserve natural resources,16 the Volga line of cases undermines 
certain CCAMLR toothfish conservation measures.17    
  
Law of the Sea, ITLOS website [hereinafter Overview ITLOS], at http:// 
www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).  
 13. The term “coastal state” in this Note refers to coastal states that are 
parties to UNCLOS. 
 14. UNCLOS delineates the EEZ as follows: “The exclusive economic zone 
shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”  UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 57.  
UNCLOS grants states sovereign rights to regulate fishing within their EEZs.  
Id. arts. 56(1), 61–62.   
 15. CCAMLR manages the commercial fishing of toothfish in the Antarctic 
and sub-Antarctic regions.  Patagonian Toothfish: Fact Sheet, Coalition of 
Legal Toothfish Operators website [hereinafter COLTO Fact Sheet], available 
at http://www.colto.org/Background_Toothfish.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).  
The CCAMLR Convention is an international fisheries instrument that en-
tered into force on April 7, 1982, and has twenty-four members: Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, European Community, Namibia, New Zea-
land, Norway, Poland, Russia, South Africa, France, Germany, India, Italy, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United 
States, and Uruguay.  NAT’L ENVTL. TR., BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD: 
ILLEGAL TRADE IN CHILEAN SEA BASS 3 (2004) [hereinafter BLACK MARKET FOR 
WHITE GOLD], available at http://www.net.org/reports/csb_report.pdf.  
 16. UNCLOS provides: 
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a re-
gional basis, directly or through competent international organiza-
tions, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards 
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Con-
vention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment, taking into account characteristic regional features. 
UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 197. 
 17. See infra Part IV.C–D. for a discussion of the impact of Volga on 
CCAMLR conservation measures. 
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The disputing states in the Volga case, the Russian Federa-
tion and Australia, were both parties to UNCLOS and the 
CCAMLR Convention at the time of the events leading to their 
dispute.18  The Volga, a Russian-owned fishing vessel flying the 
Russian Federation’s flag, had obtained a commercial license to 
fish within the Russian Federation’s EEZ, in the open sea, and 
in the coastal zones of foreign states.19  Australian authorities 
observed the Volga fleeing from Australia’s EEZ, boarded it,20 
and discovered 131,422 tons of illegally-caught toothfish.21  Aus-
tralian authorities pursued enforcement measures available to 
them under Australian law; they imposed financial and nonfi-
nancial conditions for the release of the Volga22 and brought 
criminal charges against the master and crew.23  With regard to 
the boat, Russia argued that Australia’s conditions of release 
were unreasonable vis-à-vis UNCLOS Article 73(2), which re-
quires the “prompt release” of vessels upon the posting of a 
“reasonable bond.”24  ITLOS, narrowly interpreting Articles 
  
 18. The “Volga” Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, para. 5; (stating that 
by April 1997, both countries had ratified UNCLOS), available at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).  The facts of 
the Volga case are provided in greater detail infra Part IV.B. 
 19. The “Volga” Case. paras. 30–31.  A flag state is “[t]he state in which a 
fishing vessel is registered.”  BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, 
at 4.  A flag state has the power to regulate the fishing activities of a ship 
flying its flag.  See Ian J. Popick, Comment, Are There Really Plenty of Fish in 
the Sea? The World Trade Organization’s Presence is Effectively Frustrating 
the International Community’s Attempts to Conserve the Chilean Sea Bass, 50 
EMORY L.J. 939, 964 (2001).  UNCLOS requires that nationals of other states 
fishing inside a coastal state’s EEZ “comply with the conservation measures 
and with the other terms and conditions established in the laws and regula-
tions of the coastal State.”  UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 62(4).  FAO is con-
cerned with the phenomenon of “flags of convenience,” in which states allow 
vessels from other states to fly their flags, yet fail to ensure that these vessels 
respect fishing laws.  FAO Newsroom, supra note 5.   
 20. The “Volga” Case, para. 32.  
 21. Id. para. 51. 
 22. For details of the conditions of release, see infra Part IV.B.  
 23. The “Volga” Case, paras. 40–46. 
 24. UNCLOS Article 73 provides: 
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to ex-
plore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the excu-
sive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspec-
tion, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure 
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73(2) and 292, agreed with Russia that Australia’s conditions of 
release were unreasonable.25   
The Tribunal’s interpretation of UNCLOS Articles 73(2) and 
292 is likely to impede Australia’s efforts to deter IUU fishing 
within its EEZ, and is therefore at odds with the Convention’s 
central conservationist objectives.26  For Australia to deter IUU 
fishing, it must be allowed to set conditions of release of a vessel 
that create a financial disincentive to IUU fishers.  Foreign 
poachers reap ample rewards in the marketplace for illegally-
caught toothfish.27  If the cost of obtaining the release of a vessel 
is relatively inconsequential compared to IUU fishing profits, 
IUU fishing will continue.28   
  
compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity 
with this Convention. 
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon 
the posting of reasonable bond or other security. 
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regula-
tions in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, 
in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, 
or any other form of corporal punishment. 
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State 
shall promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of 
the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed. 
UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 73.   
 25. The “Volga” Case, para. 88 (“[T]he Tribunal considers that the bond as 
sought by Australia is not reasonable within the meaning of article 292 of the 
Convention.”).  UNCLOS provides: “Upon the posting of the bond or other 
financial security determined by the court or tribunal, the authorities of the 
detaining State shall comply promptly with the decision of the court or tribu-
nal concerning the release of the vessel or its crew.”  UNCLOS, supra note 8, 
art. 292(4).  For the full text of Article 292, which contains the dispute resolu-
tion procedures for prompt release cases, see infra note 81.  
 26. UNCLOS Preamble, supra note 10. 
 27. See BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 7 (“With dock-
side prices ranging as high as $10.00 to $12.00 per pound, toothfish has rap-
idly become one of the most lucrative, illegal fishing target species globally: a 
good haul can bring $3 million.”). 
 28. This Note does not ignore the right of foreign vessels accused of IUU 
fishing to be free from arbitrary or excessive punishment.  Rather, it argues 
that in the Volga line of cases, ITLOS unnecessarily tipped the scales in favor 
of foreign pirate fishers.  The tension between a foreign state’s right to 
UNCLOS’s procedural remedies and a coastal state’s right to punish IUU 
fishing is aptly characterized as “the complex balance between due process 
and due deterrence.”  Gorina-Ysern, supra note 8, at 687–88.   
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Part II of this Note provides the background to the toothfish 
crisis.  Part III surveys UNCLOS enforcement and dispute reso-
lution provisions pertaining to IUU fishing, in particular Arti-
cles 73 and 292.  It also introduces the CCAMLR Convention, 
and highlights some of its shortcomings.29  Part IV examines the 
Volga case, the latest in a line of prompt release cases heard by 
the Tribunal.  It focuses on the Tribunal’s interpretation of key 
UNCLOS provisions, Articles 73 and 292, and the impact of its 
interpretation on coastal states’ efforts to combat IUU fishing of 
toothfish.  Part V explores alternative, broader interpretations 
of Article 73(2) to be applied in future prompt release cases.  
These interpretations are more consistent with UNCLOS’s 
strong conservationist spirit and with the sovereign rights it 
confers on coastal states, without favoring the rights of coastal 
states over those of flag states.  Part VI, the conclusion, sug-
gests amending UNCLOS Article 73(2) to cure the incompatibil-
ity of the Tribunal’s extant interpretation of Article 73(2) and 
the dire need to prevent toothfish depletion.     
II. THE PLIGHT OF THE PATAGONIAN TOOTHFISH 
Toothfish are deep-sea fish found in the waters of Antarctica 
which can live up to fifty years and grow to over two hundred 
pounds.30   Toothfish are overfished and illegally fished,31 to the 
extent that some believe they are on the “brink of extinction.”32  
  
 29. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980) [hereinafter CCAMLR 
Convention], available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/pubs/bd/toc.htm.  
 30. News Release, Illegal Harvests of Chilean Sea Bass Get Close Review: 
U.S. Aggressively Monitoring Imports; Issues Consumer Fact Sheet, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA 2002-031, Mar. 25, 2002, 
[hereinafter NOAA News Release], available at http://www.publicaffairs. 
noaa.gov/releases2002/mar02/noaa0231.html.  Two kinds of toothfish are sold 
in the United States under the name Chilean sea bass: Patagonian toothfish 
(Dissostichus eleginoides) and Antarctic toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni), 
which is similar to Patagonian toothfish, although smaller and found in colder 
waters.  BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 3.  CCAMLR regu-
lates both varieties.  Id. at 10. 
 31. Joint U.S. Dep’t of Commerce/U.S. Dep’t of State Fact Sheet: Chilean 
Sea Bass Frequently Asked Questions, Mar. 26, 2002 [hereinafter Fact Sheet: 
Chilean Sea Bass], available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/trade/chile.pdf.  
 32. Associated Press, Australia Sends Armed Ship to Protect Patagonian 
Toothfish, Dec. 17, 2003, http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/innews/armedtooth 
2003.html; Australia Arms Toothfish Patrol, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Dec. 
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Illegal fishing, in particular, undermines toothfish conservation 
efforts.33  By one estimate, the Australian fishery will be gone in 
five to fifteen years.34  Although CCAMLR tries to counter IUU 
fishing by imposing allowable catch levels and other conserva-
tion measures, large quantities of toothfish are harvested using 
banned fishing methods, and in excess of CCAMLR catch quo-
tas.35    
IUU fishing of toothfish is rampant for several reasons.36  
First, it is easy for illegally-caught fish to saturate the market.37  
Unless properly documented, they can be sold on the market by 
virtue of mere possession, without marketable title conferred by 
a valid fishing license.38  Over sixteen thousand tons of toothfish 
were legally harvested in the Antarctic in 2000;39 some estimate 
that up to twice that amount were illegally harvested.40  One 
group estimates that almost 80 percent of toothfish sold in the 
  
17, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia-pacific/3326851. 
stm.   
 33. Illegal Fishing Continues to Threaten Patagonian Toothfish, TRAFFIC 
Network, Aug. 14, 2001, available at http://www.traffic.org/toothfish/. 
 34. Fishing News International, Pacific Andes in Toothfish Storm, Jan. 
2003, available at the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators, http:// 
www.colto.org/FishingNewsInt.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).  
 35. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing, CCAMLR website, 
at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/sc/fish-monit/iuu-intro.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 
2004) (“Substantial catches of toothfish (Dissostichus spp.) have been taken by 
longline fishing well in excess of allowable catches agreed by the CCAMLR.”).  
Longliners are vessels that lay baited, hooked lines of up to one mile in length 
for approximately twenty-four hours before retrieving the catch.  See Fre-
quently Asked Questions, Division of Commercial Fisheries, Alaska Depart-
ment of Fish and Game website, at http://cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/ab 
out/faq/cf_faq.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).  
 36. This list of factors is not intended to be exhaustive.  
 37. See Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty 
Regimes in Search of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
703, 752–53 (2001) (“Once the fish are taken to port, it is unlikely that any 
buyer can determine whether the fish were lawfully taken from a particular 
maritime area.”).   
 38. See id.   
 39. Fact Sheet: Chilean Sea Bass, supra note 31.  Generally, legal fishing 
occurs when a coastal state licenses fishing rights in its to foreign fishers, 
granting them legal title to catch removed in compliance with the license.  See 
Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 752. 
 40. Fact Sheet: Chilean Sea Bass, supra note 31. 
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world is illegally obtained.41  This can happen because buyers 
cannot distinguish between lawfully and unlawfully harvested 
fish.42  It is, moreover, unrealistic to expect restaurants and 
their patrons to enquire whether their dinner was legally 
caught.43 
Another cause of rampant IUU fishing is the strong market 
demand for toothfish.  The major markets for toothfish are the 
United States, Japan, and the European Union,44 with the 
United States importing 15 to 20 percent of the world market.45 
Market prices are high, earning toothfish the nickname “white 
  
 41. Jack Williams, Australians Nab Suspected Illegal Fishing Boat After 
4,000-mile Chase, USATODAY.COM, Aug. 30, 2003, available at http:// 
www.usatoday.com/weather/resources/coldscience/2003-08-30-toothfish-
caught_x.htm (citing figures provided by the National Environmental Trust in 
Washington).  See also Australia Arms Toothfish Patrol, BBC NEWS, supra 
note 32 (“[P]oachers are thought to take more than four times the amount of 
toothfish caught legally.”). 
 42. Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 752–53.    
 43. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 8 (“[I]t is virtually 
impossible for a consumer in the U.S. to know if the Chilean Sea Bass they 
[sic] purchase in a restaurant or grocery store is legal or illegal.”).  The follow-
ing excerpt from an interview presents one chef’s perspective on the overfish-
ing crisis: 
[Question:] There are concerns these days about fish, too, for example 
about certain species that have been depleted. 
[Answer:] As a chef, it’s tough to go into that war.  Don’t eat sword-
fish tomorrow, but do you eat cod?  It changes.  Where I’m from, cod 
is now overfished.  It’s senseless for us to take a hard line on it.  It’s 
tough to be a Greenpeace man and a chef at the same time.  In my 
head, I would like to support all that, but we also have a restaurant 
where we serve people to make them happy, and that’s the reality. 
Hugo Lindgren, Questions for Marcus Samuelsson: Big Fish Story: The Ethio-
pian-born Swedish Chef is Going Japanese, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 26, 
2003, at 25. 
 44. Fact Sheet: Chilean Sea Bass, supra note 31. 
 45. NOAA News Release, supra note 30.  This figure pertains to legal im-
ports only.  Id.  In general, U.S. seafood consumption is on the rise, with per 
capita consumption reaching 15.6 per person in 2002, almost one pound more 
from the 2001 level.  Americans Ate More Seafood in 2002, Press Release No. 
NOAA03-105, Sept. 10, 2003, NOAA website, available at http://www.nmfs. 
noaa.gov/docs/2002consumption.pdf.  According to the National Environ-
mental Trust, the United States imported 85 percent of legally-caught 
CCAMLR toothfish in 2003.  BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, 
at 11. 
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gold.”46  On the docks, prices are as high as $10.00 to $12.00 per 
pound.47  Clearly, there is financial incentive for pirate fishers to 
ignore the risks involved with illegal activities.48  A dramatic 
example of such risk-taking occurred in 2003, when Australian 
authorities pursued a pirate fishing boat for twenty-one days 
through 4,000 miles of the stormy, icy Southern Ocean.49  Aus-
tralian authorities captured the boat, which contained illegally-
caught toothfish,50 the estimated value of which was as high as 
one million U.S. dollars.51 
Finally, some states are simply unable to patrol their EEZs, 
leaving the door wide open to poachers.52  Developing countries, 
in particular, lack the financial and technological resources 
necessary to deter IUU fishing.  The Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations (FAO) encourages states to 
assist developing countries in meeting their obligations under 
international and regional instruments.53 
  
 46. M. Lack & G. Sant, Patagonian Toothfish: Are Conservation and Trade 
Measures Working?, TRAFFIC Network, at http://www.traffic.org/news/ 
displayPR.cfm?prID=32 (last visited Oct. 9, 2004); Swashbuckling Customs 
Officials Land a Big Catch: Pirate Vessel Nabbed in High Seas Chase, World 
Wildlife Fund Newsroom, Aug. 28, 2003 [hereinafter Swashbuckling Cus-
toms], available at http://worldwildlife.org.news/displayPR.cfm?prID=32 (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2004).  See also Media Alert: Another Toothfish Pirate Caught 
Red Handed in Australian Waters—Spanish and Ghanian Governments 
Urged to Take Immediate Action, Oct. 6, 2003, available at http:// 
www.colto.org/COLTO_MA_6_October03.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2004) 
[hereinafter COLTO Media Alert] (“[I]t has been estimated that over 20,350 
tonnes of toothfish was taken illegally from Australian waters between 
1995/96 and 2001/2002.  At a value of $US 10 per kilo for processed fish, this 
means that around $AUS 300, million [sic] of Australian fish has been stolen 
by these pirates.”). 
 47. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 7. 
 48. Chris Masters, Reporter, The Toothfish Pirates (transcript of television 
broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sept. 9, 2002), ABC 
Online, at http://www.abc.net.au//4corners/archives/2002b_Monday30Septem 
ber2002.htm (“The pirates calculate the risks and know the returns far out-
weigh the chances of getting caught.”). 
 49. Williams, supra note 41.   
 50. Id.   
 51. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 7. 
 52. See Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 754.   
 53. IPOA-IUU, supra note 6, §. V. 
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III. UNCLOS PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO IUU FISHING; CCAMLR 
CONVENTION 
A. UNCLOS Delineation of Ocean Zones 
UNCLOS delineates three main ocean zones and their rele-
vant jurisdictions: the territorial sea, the EEZ, and the high 
seas.54  Every coastal state has a territorial sea with a breadth 
of twelve nautical miles55 over which that state is sovereign.56  
The EEZ, extending two hundred nautical miles from the coast-
line,57 is the area in which a coastal state has sovereign rights 
over the management of its natural resources,58 including juris-
diction over “the protection and preservation of the marine en-
vironment.”59   
The high seas are defined as “all parts of the sea that are not 
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or 
in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of 
an archipelagic State.”60  States are prohibited from claiming 
sovereign rights to any part of the high seas.61  Their nationals, 
however, may fish on the high seas to the extent permissible 
under international and regional treaties governing the conser-
vation of the living resources on the high seas.62  Treaties may, 
  
 54. See UNCLOS, supra note 8. 
 55. Id. art. 3 (“Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its 
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from 
baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”). 
 56. Id. art. 2(1) (“The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its 
land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its 
archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial 
sea.”).  However, a state’s sovereignty over its territorial sea is subject to the 
Convention and to other international laws.  Id. art 2(3).  
 57. Id. art. 57. 
 58. Id. art. 56(1).  Although oceans cover approximately 71 percent of the 
earth’s surface, 95 percent of the world’s fish are caught within 200 miles of 
the coast.  LAWRENCE JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE 
MANAGEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE 5 (1996) (citing FAO’s 
figures).  This fact underscores the importance of controlling overfishing and 
IUU fishing within coastal states’ EEZs. 
 59. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 56(1)(b)(iii). 
 60. Id. art. 86.  
 61. Id. art. 89. 
 62. Id. arts. 116–18 (Article 116 provides that “[a]ll States have the right 
for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: (a) their 
treaty obligations. . . .”).  
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for example, impose allowable catch limits on certain species.63  
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between IUU fishing oc-
curring inside a state’s EEZ and permissible fishing on the high 
seas.   For example, a foreign vessel may hover just outside a 
coastal state’s EEZ to capture fish as they swim from within the 
EEZ to the high seas.64    
B. UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Provisions 
UNCLOS dispute resolution mechanisms, found in Part XV of 
the Convention, are divided into three basic sections:65  Section 
One (General Provisions) authorizes disputing parties to choose 
any “peaceful means”66 of dispute resolution, either independ-
ently or under a general, regional or bilateral agreement, pro-
vided that the resulting decision is binding.67  If the states fail to 
peacefully resolve their dispute, they are subject to the options 
set forth in Section Two (Compulsory Procedures Entailing 
Binding Decisions).68  Under Section Two, states may choose to 
bring their dispute before ITLOS, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), or one of two arbitration tribunals.69  Under 
UNCLOS, both the ICJ and ITLOS have jurisdiction to hear 
cases requiring the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, 
however, parties may not submit the same case to both courts, 
nor is forum-shopping permitted.70  However, applications for 
prompt release, such as the Volga case, have been heard by the 
  
 63. See id. art. 119(1). 
 64. Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 752. This may be illegal under 
UNCLOS.  Id. 
 65. For a summary of these three sections, see Jonathan L. Hafetz, Foster-
ing Protection of the Marine Environment and Economic Development: Article 
121(3) of the Third Law of the Sea Convention, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 583, 
632–33 (2000). 
 66. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 279. 
 67. Id. art. 282. 
 68. Id. art. 286. 
 69. Id. art. 287(1).  However, “unless the parties otherwise agree, the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal is mandatory in cases relating to the prompt release 
of vessels and crews under article 292 of the Convention and to provisional 
measures pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal under article 290, 
paragraph 5, of the Convention.”  Overview ITLOS, supra note 12. 
 70. See Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L & 
POL. 809, 811 (1999).  
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Tribunal.71  Finally, Section Three indicates certain types of dis-
putes that are exempt from Section Two’s compulsory dispute 
settlement scheme, which includes disputes over maritime 
boundaries, issues before the U.N. Security Council, military 
matters, and certain fisheries and marine scientific research 
conflicts.72   
C. Enforcement Problems  
When IUU fishing occurs inside a coastal state’s EEZ, the 
state may impose its national laws rather than submit the dis-
pute to UNCLOS’s binding settlement procedures.73  This may 
be preferable in instances where a coastal state’s domestic fish-
ing laws are stricter, hence more protective, than those permis-
sible under UNCLOS.74  Some states, however, are unable to 
enforce their national fishing laws for lack of financial or tech-
nical resources.  Others simply choose not to enforce their own 
laws.  In such situations, IUU fishing goes unchecked, in direct 
opposition to the spirit of UNCLOS.75   
Another, perhaps obvious, enforcement problem is that states 
fail to ratify or implement UNCLOS and other fisheries man-
  
 71. The UNCLOS drafters bestowed on ITLOS the compulsory residual 
jurisdiction to interpret prompt release cases, therefore relevant case law will 
mostly be found with ITLOS.  Erik Franckx, “Reasonable Bond” in the Prac-
tice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
303, 309 (2002).  
 72. UNCLOS, supra note 8, arts. 297–99.  See also LEE A. KIMBALL, 
INTERNATIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: USING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ORGANIZATIONS TO MANAGE MARINE RESOURCES SUSTAINABLY 9 (2003).   
 73. KIMBALL, supra note 72, at 9.  UNCLOS provides that: 
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provi-
sions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in 
accordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be 
obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute re-
lating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in 
the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretion-
ary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capac-
ity . . .  and the terms and conditions established in its conservation 
and management law and regulations. 
UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 297(3)(a).  
 74. See Eichenberg & Shapson, supra note 4, at 607. 
 75. See Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 754. 
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agement treaties.76  Following the Round Table on the Sustain-
able Development of Global Fisheries, with Particular Refer-
ence to Enforcement against IUU Fishing on the on the High 
Seas in June, 2003, the Secretary-General on Oceans and the 
Law of the Sea reported that “few States had ratified and im-
plemented these instruments.”77  International instruments that 
regulate IUU fishing have, thus, been ineffective “due to a lack 
of political will, priority, capacity and resources to ratify or ac-
cede to and implement them.”78   
Therefore, although dispute resolution mechanisms are 
available under UNCLOS and other instruments, enforcement 
problems weaken their effectiveness in the battle to end IUU 
fishing. 
D. UNCLOS Enforcement and Dispute Resolution in Prompt 
Release Cases: Article 73(2) 
If a coastal state believes a foreign vessel has violated its 
EEZ, as Australia did in the Volga case, UNCLOS Article 73(1) 
authorizes the coastal state to seize the offending vessel.79  A 
coastal state is authorized to board and inspect a vessel, arrest 
  
 76. The Pew Oceans Commission urges the United States to ratify 
UNCLOS.  PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 1, at 80–81.  The United States, 
however, has taken steps toward enforcing import regulations on toothfish, 
and is a CCAMLR member.  Journal Staff, Recent Development: A Review of 
Developments in Ocean and Coastal Law 2001-2002, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 
367, 373 (2002).   NOAA recently rejected improperly documented toothfish 
shipments, in an effort to support international conservation measures.  U.S. 
Turns Away Improper Patagonian Toothfish Shipments: Clarifies Intent to 
Enforce International Conservation Provisions, Press Release No. NOAA04-
093, NOAA website, Sept. 28, 2004, available at http://www.nmfs.no 
aa.gov/docs/04-093_toothfish.pdf.  See also Sabrina Tavernise, 3 Are Sentenced 
for Smuggling Chilean Sea Bass and Rock Lobster, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2004, 
at B6 (reporting that a federal judge sentenced two people to prison for smug-
gling large quantities of Chilean sea bass and rock lobster). 
 77. U.N. GAOR, 58nd Sess., Agenda Item 53(a) para. 65, U.N. Doc.  
A/58/65/Add.1 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assem 
bly/general_assembly_reports.htm (The obstacle to managing global fisheries 
in a sustainable way is the “difficulty of enforcing good practice and legal in-
struments relating to fisheries management on the high seas, especially in 
relation to the intractable issue of IUU fishing.”).  
 78. IPOA-IUU, supra note 6, para. 1. 
 79. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 73(1).  For the full text of Article 73, see 
supra note 24.   
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the crew, and implement judicial proceedings against a foreign 
party that violates its national fisheries laws.80   If, however, the 
coastal state fails to promptly release the vessel once the for-
eign state has posted a reasonable bond, UNCLOS Article 292 
authorizes the foreign state to file an application for prompt 
release with the competent court or tribunal.81  This is what 
happened in the Volga case; when Russia and Australia failed 
to agree on the conditions of release of the Volga and its crew, 
Russia filed an application for prompt release with ITLOS.82  
  
 80. Id.   
 81. Article 292 describes the procedures that apply in prompt release dis-
putes: 
1.    Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel fly-
ing the flag of another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining 
State has not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the 
prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reason-
able bond or other financial security, the question of release from de-
tention may be submitted to any court or tribunal agreed upon by the 
parties, or, failing such agreement within 10 days from the time of 
detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State un-
der 287 or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
unless the parties otherwise agree. 
2.    The application for release may be made only by or on behalf of 
the flag State of the vessel. 
3.    The court or tribunal shall deal without delay with the applica-
tion for release and shall deal only with the question of release, with-
out prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domes-
tic forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew.  The authorities of 
the detaining State remain competent to release the vessel or its crew 
at any time. 
4.     Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security deter-
mined by the court or tribunal, the authorities of the detaining State 
shall comply promptly with the decision of the court or tribunal con-
cerning the release of the vessel or its crew. 
Id. art. 292. 
 82. Conversely, if the disputing states resolve their conflict within ten 
days, perhaps under the enforcement provisions of bilateral agreement or 
regional convention, UNCLOS prompt release mechanisms do not come into 
play.  Some disputes end at this stage because the flag state simply prefers to 
pay the bond to avoid protracted proceedings.   
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E. The CCAMLR Convention 
The CCAMLR Convention is a regional treaty that came into 
force in 1982 with the purpose of conserving marine life in the 
Southern Ocean, while permitting the rational harvesting of 
living resources.83   CCAMLR uses scientific advice as a basis for 
its conservation measures.84  Its approach is ecosystem-based, 
meaning it does not limit its focus to individual species, but 
“take[s] into account ecological links between species.”85   Par-
ties to the CCAMLR Convention agree to conduct their harvest-
ing activities in the Southern Ocean in accordance with the 
“prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population 
to levels below those which ensure its stable recruitment.”86  To 
that end, the CCAMLR Convention designates the quantity of a 
given species that may be harvested inside the Convention 
area.87  With regard to toothfish, it imposes annual catch limits, 
prohibits harvesting in certain ocean areas, requires compliance 
with its Catch Documentation Scheme,88 and requires vessels 
flagged by CCAMLR member states to use a Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS).89   
Unfortunately, CCAMLR’s conservation scheme is impeded in 
several ways.  First, it is very difficult for member states to po-
lice the Southern Ocean, which is vast and inhospitable.”90  Sec-
  
 83. General Introduction, CCAMLR website, at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/ 
e/gen-intro.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).   
The Southern Ocean surrounds the continent of Antarctica and is 
clearly delimited by the Antarctic Convergence (or Polar Front), 
which is formed where cold Antarctic waters meet warmer waters to 
the north.  The Antarctic Convergence acts as an effective biological 
barrier, and the Southern Ocean is therefore substantially a closed 
ecosystem. 
Id.  Patagonian toothfish are found primarily in the Southern Ocean and ad-
jacent waters.  COLTO Fact Sheet, supra note 15. 
 84. General Introduction, CCAMLR website, supra note 83. 
 85. Id.  For example, one of the Convention’s early concerns was the effect 
of excessive krill catches on other marine life that fed on krill, as well as its 
effect on krill populations themselves.  Id.  
 86. CCAMLR Convention, supra note 29, art. II(3)(a). 
 87. Id. art. IX(2)(a).  
 88. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 8.  
 89. Id. at 17–18.  VMS devices monitor the location of fishing vessels in 
order to determine where their catches are made.  Id.   
 90. COLTO Fact Sheet, supra note 15.   
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ond, some experts believe CCAMLR’s estimates of the decline in 
toothfish populations are conservative, and that some popula-
tions are in fact commercially extinct.91  If this is true, 
CCAMLR’s current conservation efforts would be insufficient in 
light of the actual level of toothfish depopulation.  Another ob-
stacle to CCAMLR’s conservation measures is its overall lack of 
enforcement capabilities; it cannot punish member states that 
violate CCAMLR Convention rules.92  CCAMLR members rely 
on “public pressure” to encourage offending nations to comply 
with the rules.93  Some members simply fail to enforce the con-
vention’s requirements.94  For example, a flag state may fail to 
observe CCAMLR’s toothfish catch limits.95  Finally, other trea-
ties, such as UNCLOS, may restrict the scope of CCAMLR’s 
effectiveness.  ITLOS’s narrow interpretation of the term “rea-
sonable bond” in prompt release cases limits CCAMLR’s ability 
  
 91. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 11.  Australia nomi-
nated toothfish to be listed in Appendix II of the Convention for the Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).  Com-
mission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of 
the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission (2002), paras. 10.1–.75 [herein-
after CCAMLR-XXI Meeting], available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/pubs 
/cr/02/all.pdf.  Appendix II includes:  
(a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened with 
extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is 
subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible 
with their survival; and  
(b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order that 
trade in specimens of certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) 
of this paragraph may be brought under effective control.   
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, art. II(2), available at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml#I (appendices available at http:// 
www.cites.org/eng/append/appendices.shtml).   
  Very recently, CCAMLR indicated that pirate fishing of toothfish in its 
convention region significantly declined in 2004.  Toothfish Pirates Reducing 
the Plunder, Figures Show, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 12, 2004, available at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3609369&thesection=ne
ws&thesubsection=general.  However, the report of CCAMLR’s 23rd annual 
meeting, which will presumably provide relevant data, is not available at the 
time of this Note’s publication. 
 92. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 18. 
 93. Eichenberg & Shapson, supra note 4, at 615–16. 
 94. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 18. 
 95. Eichenberg & Shapson, supra note 4, at 615. 
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to enforce CCAMLR Convention conservation measures.  In 
Volga, for example, ITLOS concluded that Australia could not, 
as a condition of release, require the Volga to carry a VMS de-
vice and comply with other CCAMLR requirements.96    
IV. THE VOLGA CASE 
A. Pre-Volga Prompt Release Cases 
Since it began hearing cases in 1996,97 six of the Tribunal’s 
twelve judgments involved prompt release disputes.98  Volga 
was the sixth application for prompt release heard by ITLOS.99  
In four of the six cases, a coastal state seized a foreign vessel 
containing large quantities of illegally-caught toothfish.100  
These cases illustrate the Tribunal’s approach to prompt re-
lease disputes, specifically its balancing approach, with which it 
weighs the interests of the flag state, which seeks release of its 
vessel, against those of the coastal state, which seeks to punish 
and deter IUU fishing.   
This balancing approach at first appears consistent with the 
goal of UNCLOS Article 292, namely to balance the interests of 
coastal and flag states.101  This Note argues, however, that the 
Tribunal’s balancing approach is flawed.  Despite its stated ob-
jective to balance the interests of the disputing parties, the Tri-
bunal has invariably undervalued or ignored factors favoring a 
  
 96. See infra Part IV.C–D. for an analysis of the Tribunal’s interpretation 
of the term “reasonable bond” and the impact of this interpretation on deter-
ring IUU fishing.  
 97. Frequently Asked Questions (Q & A), ITLOS website, available at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).   
 98. See Proceedings and Judgments—List of Cases, ITLOS website, avail-
able at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).   
 99. Sarah Derrington & Michael White, Australian Maritime Law Update: 
2002, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 363, 364 (2003).  For a thorough explanation of 
how UNCLOS prompt release procedures work, and an analysis of ITLOS’s 
interpretation of the term “reasonable bond,” see generally Franckx, supra 
note 71. 
 100. See id. at 311–22.  In addition to the Volga case, the prompt release 
cases are: The “Camouco” Case (Panama v. France), ITLOS Case No. 5 (2000); 
The “Monte Confurco” Case (Seychelles v. France), ITLOS Case No. 6 (2000); 
and The “Grand Prince” Case (Belize v. France), ITLOS Case No. 8 (2001).  Id. 
at 311.  These judgments are available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 101. See Franckx, supra note 71, at 305.   
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coastal state’s sovereign right to punish IUU fishing within its 
EEZ.  The balancing approach, moreover, is ill-defined, muta-
ble, and applied inconsistently from case to case to serve the 
desired outcome of obtaining the release of a seized vessel.102  
Although the Tribunal is in its relative infancy and has heard 
only a handful of prompt release cases, these judgments could 
hamper the ability of individual states and regional organiza-
tions to deter IUU fishing.103  The balancing test is therefore 
flawed because it gives insufficient weight to marine life con-
servation, an essential UNCLOS value, and because it lacks the 
specificity needed to provide sufficient notice to states. 
B. Facts of the Volga Case and the Dispute over the  
Conditions of Release  
The Volga was owned by a Russian company, and its master 
was a Russian national.104  After Australian authorities boarded 
the vessel on February 7, 2002, they informed the master that 
the Volga had been apprehended under Australia’s Fisheries 
Management Act of 1991 because it had been fishing illegally 
inside Australia’s EEZ.105  The master and crew were detained 
pursuant to the Act.106  On February 20, 2002, Australia notified 
the master that the boat, nets, traps, equipment, and catch had 
been seized.107  Three crew members, all Spanish nationals, were 
charged with the indictable, strict liability offense of commer-
cial fishing without a license within Australia’s EEZ.108   
Russia contended that Australian authorities had violated 
UNCLOS Article 72(3) when they set what Russia considered 
unreasonable conditions for the release of the Volga and crew.  
The conditions for release of the crew, approved by the Full 
  
 102. See infra Part IV(C)(3) for more on the inherent inconsistencies in the 
Tribunal’s balancing approach. 
 103. For an analysis of the Tribunal’s balancing approach in Volga, see infra 
Part IV.C.  
 104. The “Volga” Case, para. 2.  The Volga’s fishing license required that its 
activities comply with fishing industry rules and international agreements.  
Derrington & White, supra note 99, at 364.  
 105. The “Volga” Case, paras. 33–34. 
 106. Id. para. 35.  The master died in an Australian hospital without being 
charged with any offense.  Id. para. 42.   
 107. Id. para. 36. 
 108. Id. paras. 38–39.   
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Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, were: 
AU$75,000109 cash for each crew member, the surrender of all 
passports and seaman’s papers, and the requirement that the 
crew remain in Perth.110  The Volga’s owner posted bail for the 
crew.111  The crux of the Volga case, however, was the dispute 
over the terms of release of the vessel, which were twofold: Aus-
tralia demanded a security in the amount of AU$3,332,500 and 
imposed additional, non-financial conditions.112  As non-financial 
conditions of release, Australia required the Volga to carry a 
VMS during the course of the legal proceedings, and to observe 
CCAMLR conservation rules.113  The boat’s owner rejected Aus-
tralia’s conditions of release as unreasonable, and agreed only 
to post the considerably lower amount of AU$500,000.114  The 
Tribunal ultimately held that the bond for release of the Volga 
should be AU$1,920,000,115 representing the value of the vessel, 
  
 109. On February 1, 2002, one Australian dollar equaled .51 U.S. dollars.  
Currency Converter, Bank of Canada, at http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/ 
en/exchform.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004). 
 110. The “Volga” Case, para. 41. 
 111. Id. para. 42.  Russia, however, maintained that the terms of release of 
the crew were “not envisaged by article 73(2)” and thus “not permissible or 
reasonable in terms of the Convention.” Id. para. 48. 
 112. Australia set the following conditions of release for the Volga:  
[A] security to be lodged amounting to AU$ 3,332,500, for release of 
the vessel.  The security amount is based on what Australia considers 
reasonable in respect of three elements: 
- assessed value of the vessel, fuel, lubricants and fishing equipment 
- potential fines 
- carriage of a fully operational VMS [Vessel Monitoring System] and 
observance of CCAMLR . . . conservation measures until the conclu-
sion of legal proceedings. 
Id. para. 53.  The AU$3,332,500 security consisted of the value of the vessel, 
fuel, and lubricants (AU$1,920,000); potential fines imposed on crew members 
pending criminal proceedings (AU$412,500); and security for the VMS system 
and observance of CCAMLR rules (AU$1,000,000).  Id. para. 72.  Australian 
authorities sold the 131,422 tons of toothfish found on the Volga for nearly 
two million Australian dollars, which they held in trust pending the outcome 
of legal proceedings.  Id. para. 51. 
 113. Id.  Recall that both Russia and Australia were CCAMLR members 
and were therefore required to carry VMS equipment.  See supra text accom-
panying note 17.  
 114. The “Volga” Case, para. 54. 
 115. Id. para. 90.  
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fuel, and lubricants, and rejected Australia’s additional, non-
financial conditions. 
C. The Tribunal’s Balancing Approach: The Question of  
Reasonableness  
In Volga, the Tribunal had to determine whether the bond 
and conditions set by Australia were reasonable under 
UNCLOS Article 73(2).116  UNCLOS does not define the term 
“reasonable.”117  The Tribunal characterizes its task in prompt 
release cases as to determine whether a prompt release claim 
against a detaining state is “well-founded.”118  To that end, the 
Tribunal developed its balancing approach.   
In Volga, the Tribunal had to balance the Russian Federa-
tion’s contention that the conditions of release of the vessel and 
crew were unreasonable119 against Australia’s position that the 
bond was reasonable based on “the value of the Volga, its fuel, 
lubricants and fishing equipment; the gravity of the offences 
and potential penalties; the level of international concern over 
illegal fishing; and the need to secure compliance with Austra-
lian laws and international obligations pending the completion 
of domestic proceedings.”120  To determine the reasonableness of 
the requested AU$3,332,500 security, the Tribunal considered 
factors it had deemed relevant in prior prompt release cases, in 
particular: “the gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties 
imposed or imposable under laws of the detaining State, the 
value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, [and] the 
amount of bond imposed by the detaining State and its form.”121  
The Tribunal did not intend this list of factors to be exhaus-
  
 116. Id. paras. 58–61.   
 117. See Franckx, supra note 71, at 306–09.  ITLOS’s Rules of the Tribunal 
provide that the Tribunal’s task in prompt release cases is to determine 
whether a claim that a detaining state has not complied with prompt release 
provisions is “well-founded,” and if well-founded, the “amount, nature and 
form of the bond or financial security.”  Id. at 308.   
 118. Id. (citing the Tribunal’s Rules). 
 119. The “Volga” Case, para. 60.  
 120. Id.  para. 61. 
 121. Id. para. 63 (citing the judgment in the “Camouco” case (2000)).  Be-
cause Article 292 disputes are subject to obligatory third-party settlement, 
usually by ITLOS, case law on the reasonableness criterion will tend to be 
consistent.  See Franckx, supra 71, at 325–26. 
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tive.122  Rather, the assessment of reasonableness was to be 
made on a case-by-case basis.123   
1. Gravity of the Offense 
The Tribunal failed to allocate sufficient weight to the gravity 
of the Russian Federation’s offense, namely IUU fishing of a 
fragile species.  Moreover, it did not articulate a clear basis for 
rejecting the two indications of gravity asserted by Australia: 
first, the potential penalties for IUU fishing within Australia’s 
EEZ, which constituted evidence that Australia considered IUU 
fishing a serous matter, and, second, that IUU fishing was a 
problem of significant international concern, particularly in the 
CCAMLR Convention region, where there was a “serious deple-
tion of the stocks of Patagonian toothfish ….”124   
After conceding that the offenses were grave125 and that inter-
national fishing concerns were a factor in its balancing test, the 
Tribunal nevertheless suggested that these concerns were nei-
ther dispositive nor necessary to the balancing equation.126  
Gravity was, rather, an ancillary or optional factor that the Tri-
bunal “may” consider when evaluating the reasonableness of 
penalties.127  The Tribunal implied that it deemed itself pre-
cluded from considering the gravity of the offense in a meaning-
ful way because it perceived its primary “purpose” to be secur-
ing the prompt release of the Volga.128  To secure prompt release 
of the vessel, then, the Tribunal would need to downplay factors 
supporting Australia’s position.  This approach invariably fa-
vors the foreign state’s interests over those of the detaining 
state: the imposition of any bond or condition of release that 
  
 122. The “Volga” Case, para. 64 (citing the judgment in the “Monte Con-
furco” Case (2000)).  The Tribunal emphasized in Monte Confurco that it did 
not wish to “lay down rigid rules as to the exact weight to be attached to each 
of them.”  Id.  
 123. See id. para. 65 (citing the Monte Confurco case). 
 124. Id. para. 67. 
 125. Id. para. 68 (“The Tribunal takes note of the the submissions of the 
Respondent.  The Tribunal understands the international concerns about 
illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and appreciates the objective 
taken by States, including the States Parties to CCAMLR, to deal with the 
problem.”).  Id. 
 126. See id. para. 69. 
 127. Id.  
 128. See id. 
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interferes with prompt release will be given insufficient 
weight.129  It would seem, therefore, that the Tribunal’s balanc-
ing test is flexible to the point of being illusory.  One is left to 
wonder whether the Tribunal is giving mere lip service coastal 
states’ sovereign rights under UNCLOS to manage marine re-
sources within their EEZs.  
2. Non-financial Conditions of Release 
The Tribunal construed the term “bond or other security” in 
Article 73(2) to exclude non-financial conditions.130  It pointed to 
the text of Article 292 and other UNCLOS provisions in which 
appears the term “bond or other financial security” for the “con-
text” and concluded that the “object and purpose” of this lan-
guage in Article 73(2) dictated nothing more than purely finan-
cial conditions.131  To support this conclusion, the Tribunal ob-
served that, had the UNCLOS drafters intended to permit non-
financial conditions of release, they would have written them 
into the Convention.132  The Tribunal, thus, restricted its inquiry 
to a plain meaning textual analysis.  It declined to consider 
whether a coastal state is “entitled” to impose non-financial 
conditions under the Convention “in the exercise of its sovereign 
rights.”133  Perhaps the task of reconciling Australia’s sovereign 
rights under UNCLOS with the mandates of Articles 73(2) and 
  
 129. The Tribunal was equally dismissive of the gravity of the offense factor 
in pre-Volga prompt release cases: 
[W]ith respect to the other relevant factors, namely the gravity of the 
offences and the range of penalties applicable, the Tribunal usually 
simply states that it “takes note” of the submissions made, without 
any further indication of the weight given to the evidence or ele-
ments.  Especially in the Monte Confurco Case this technique sharply 
contrasted with the considerable efforts of France to develop the ar-
gument regarding gravity of the offense [sic] before the Tribunal. 
Franckx, supra note 71, at 336–37. 
 130. The “Volga” Case, para. 76. (“In these proceedings, the question to be 
decided is whether the ‘bond or other security’ mentioned in article 73 para-
graph 2 of the Convention may include such conditions.”). 
 131. Id.  para. 77.  Article 73(2) does not contain the qualifying word “finan-
cial” where it refers to the “other security,” whereas Article 292(1) contains 
the term “other financial security.”  For the full text of these provisions, see, 
respectively, supra notes 24 and 81. 
 132. The “Volga” Case, para. 77.   
 133. Id. para. 76. 
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292 was too daunting.  Instead, the Tribunal narrowly con-
strued Articles 73(2) and 292. 
3. The Balancing Approach Offers Poor Guidance to  
UNCLOS Member States 
The balancing test, as articulated and applied by the Tribu-
nal in the Volga line of cases, offers poor guidance to national 
judges who set the amount of bond on a seized vessel.134  Simi-
larly, the test is a poor guide for national legislatures charged 
with setting the guidelines for their courts.  The risk is that, 
despite the dire need to deter IUU fishing, judges and legisla-
tures will act cautiously by setting low bonds, in order to avoid 
the inconvenience of prompt release disputes, in anticipation of 
losing such disputes, or simply out of confusion with regard to 
the meaning of the term “reasonable bond.”  In this sense, the 
effect of the Tribunal’s standard of reasonableness in prompt 
release disputes, to the extent one can be defined, is contrary to 
the conservationist spirit of UNCLOS with respect to IUU fish-
ing.135 
  
 134. In the prompt release cases that preceded Volga, the balancing test 
lacked cohesiveness, and thus was a poor guide to states:  
The interaction among the different relevant factors, the fact that the 
list of factors is said to be non-exhaustive, and the Tribunal’s mani-
fest refusal to clarify the interrelation of the factors, have made a 
horizontal analysis of the different cases, in order to try to discern 
some predictability for future cases, a very difficult, if not impossible, 
exercise. 
Franckx, supra note 71, at 337.  Consequently, there is a danger that the Tri-
bunal’s loose guidance will make it easier for national courts to manipulate 
the factors in its balancing test to come up with their desired result:  
The lack of precision, caused by the unwillingness of the Tribunal to 
narrow further the general contours set thus far, could nave a nega-
tive influence on national judges who might try to “misuse” the broad 
framework created by the Tribunal.  Members of the Tribunal have 
noted that “national adjudication bodies welcome this guidance”…. 
Franckx, supra note 71, at 338.  A national judge must apply domestic fishing 
laws and also comply with the standard expressed in international instru-
ments.  See Bernard H. Oxman & Vincent P. Bantz, International Decision: 
The “Camouco” (Panama v. France) (Judgment). ITLOS Case No. 5, 94 
A.J.I.L. 713, 720 (2000) (criticizing a French judge’s failure to invoke 
UNCLOS in his reasoning when determining the amount bond in the 
Camouco case, when under French law treaties trump statutes). 
 135. In his Separate Opinion, Judge Cot explained: 
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D.  Separate and Dissenting Opinions to the Volga Case 
It is reassuring that several members of the Volga Tribunal 
acknowledge that illegal fishing of toothfish is a grave offense, 
and that the majority’s holding will likely impede coastal states’ 
efforts to combat it.  In his Separate Opinion, Judge Jean-Pierre 
Cot emphasized the need to “clarify the difficulties encountered 
by States in combating [IUU fishing] in the Southern Ocean.”136  
He articulated a specific concern for the plight of toothfish, and 
an awareness that the majority’s ruling may frustrate 
CCAMLR’s efforts to protect toothfish.137  Judge Cot’s reference 
to the financial lure of toothfish poaching138 underscored the 
need for stinging financial penalties, in the form of hefty bonds.  
Unlike the majority, Judge Cot emphasized Australia’s legiti-
mate sovereign rights under UNCLOS to take necessary en-
forcement and deterrence measures to combat IUU fishing in-
side its EEZ.139  These rights include the right to determine ap-
  
CCAMLR’s verdict on the devastation caused by illegal fishing in the 
region is damning.  The proceeds of illegal fishing appear to be 
greater than those of licensed fishing—at least that was CCAMLR’s 
estimate for the 1997/98 season—and therefore more than double the 
level of catches regarded as the maximum to ensure the preservation 
of the species.  If the parties to the Convention do not manage to put 
an end to these practices, stocks of Patagonian toothfish will be com-
pletely wiped out within about ten years. 
The “Volga” Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, para. 6 (2002), available at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 136. Id. para. 2. 
 137. See supra note 135. 
 138. The Volga 
achieved an illegal catch of 100 tonnes of Patagonian toothfish in 
nine weeks, which was sold by the Australian authorities for the sum 
of AU$ 1,932,579, while the vessel, its fuel oil and its fishing gear 
were estimated at AU$ 1,920,000. . . .With a full hold, the fish caught 
illegally in the course of a fishing season are worth more than twice 
the price of the vessel. 
Id. para. 7. 
 139. According to Judge Cot: 
The measures taken by Australia, both in terms of prevention and en-
forcement, clearly fall within the scope of the efforts made by interna-
tional organizations to combat [IUU fishing].  They come under arti-
cle 56 of [UNCLOS] and have been taken in pursuance of the sover-
eign rights exercised by coastal States for the purpose of exploring, 
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propriate monetary penalties, the amount of which UNCLOS 
neither limits nor defines.140  The Tribunal, Judge Cot points 
out, should not interfere with these sovereign rights.141   
Judge Cot, however, drew the line at the form of bond a state 
may impose, agreeing with the majority’s conclusion that 
UNCLOS Articles 73(2) and 292 authorize a coastal state to set 
a bond or security that is strictly financial in nature, but not 
non-financial conditions.142  The effect of such non-financial con-
ditions, he reasoned, might upset the tension between the 
rights of coastal and flag states, by giving the coastal state ad-
ditional “coercive power.”143   
Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer, in his dissenting opinion, agreed 
with the opinions expressed by Judge Cot,144 but went one step 
further.145  With regard to the monetary amount of a bond or 
security permissible under UNCLOS, Judge Shearer concluded 
that “illegal fishing must be punished with a high and deterrent 
level of monetary penalty.”146  To support this conclusion, he 
emphasized that the Volga had the capacity to hold 275.6 tons 
of fish, so that its potential illegal catch greatly exceeded the 
  
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the 
[EEZ].  
Id. para. 11.      
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. para. 12 (“The Tribunal has a duty to respect the implementation 
by the coastal State of its sovereign rights with regard to the conservation of 
living recourses, particularly as these measures should be seen within the 
context of a concerted effort within the FAO and CCAMLR.”).  However, a 
state may not take arbitrary actions within the scope of its sovereign rights.  
Id.   
 142. The “Volga” Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, para. 26.  Australia 
required that the Volga be equipped with a VMS device and respect CCAMLR 
regulations.  See supra note 112, and accompanying text. 
 143. Id. 
 144. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer, 
para. 12. 
 145.  It is worth noting the significance of there being more than one dissent 
in the Volga case: “This was not a lone dissent (so often the fate of the ad hoc 
judge), and that makes it more difficult, however large the majority, to dis-
miss the merits of the opinion. Judge Anderson dissented too, and for largely 
similar reasons.”  Ryszard Piotrowicz, The Song of the Volga Boatmen—Please 
Release Me, AUSTRALIAN L. J., 160, 162 (2003). 
 146. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer, 
para. 11. 
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actual catch found on board, or 131 tons of toothfish;147 that, as 
parties to UNCLOS and the CCAMLR Convention, Australia 
and Russia were required to conserve living resources; and that 
it is difficult for states to patrol the Southern Ocean, where 
weather is “bleak and cold, with high winds and heavy seas.”148   
On the question of the permissibility of non-financial condi-
tions of release, Judge Shearer faulted the majority for its “nar-
row interpretation” of the provisions of Articles 73(2) and 292.149  
He pointed out that Russia had, in fact, quantified in monetary 
terms the requirement that the Volga carry a VMS.150  There is, 
then, a financial component to this condition, which could be 
considered a form of bond.151  Judge Shearer further observed 
that even a narrow interpretation of the terms “bond” and “fi-
nancial security”152 does not necessarily preclude non-financial 
  
 147. Id. para. 6. 
 148. Id. paras. 9–10. 
 149. Id. para. 17. 
 150. Id. para. 16.  Note, too, that the majority’s characterization of the bond 
imposed by Australia accords financial values to each of the non-financial 
conditions of release:  
- a security to cover the assessed value of the vessel, fuel, lubricants 
and fishing equipment (AU$ 1,920,000); 
- an amount (AU$ 412, 500) to secure payment of potential fines im-
posed in the criminal proceedings that are still pending against 
members of the crew; 
- a security (AU$ 1,000,000) related to the carriage of a fully opera-
tional VMS and observance of CCAMLR conservation measures. 
The “Volga” Case, para. 72. 
 151. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer, 
para. 16.  (“Even though [Australia] quantified this requirement in monetary 
terms at AU$ 1,000,000 it has nevertheless been regarded by the Tribunal as 
a non-financial security since it is essentially in the nature of a “good behav-
iour bond” for the future. . . .”).  
 152. Judge Shearer criticizes the majority’s narrow interpretation of Arti-
cles 73(2) and 292: 
In the short period since the conclusion of the Convention in 1982, 
and in the even shorter period since its entry into force in 1994, there 
have been catastrophic declines in the stocks of many fish species 
throughout the world.  The words “bond” and “financial security” 
should be given a liberal and purposive interpretation in order to en-
able the Tribunal to take full account of the measures—including 
those made possible by modern technology—found necessary by many 
coastal States (and mandated by regional and sub-regional fisheries 
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“associated conditions that are not of themselves financial in 
nature.”153  He analogized that requiring a vessel to carry a VMS 
device is similar to the practice of national criminal courts that 
set bail conditions in an effort to deter recidivism.154  For exam-
ple, an individual released on bail might be prohibited from cer-
tain conduct as a condition of release.155  It is unclear whether 
Judge Shearer found support for this analogy implicit in the 
text of UNCLOS, or as an extension of customary national prac-
tice or international customary law, or simply as a matter of 
common sense.   
Finally, Judge Shearer compared the authentic French text of 
Article 73(2) to the English language version, observing that the 
literal meaning of the French version “imported a wider margin 
of appreciation for the setting of bonds by national authorities 
than that imported by the word ‘reasonable’….”156 
Judge David H. Anderson, in his dissenting opinion, con-
cluded that a literal reading of Article 73(2) does, in fact, permit 
non-financial conditions of release of the Volga.157  First, he 
found that Article 73 “contains no explicit restriction upon the 
imposition of non-financial conditions for release of arrested 
vessels.”158  He further found that, although the term “other se-
  
organisations) to deter by way of judicial and administrative orders 
the plundering of the living resources of the sea. 
Id. para. 17. 
 153. Id. para. 18 (in which Judge Shearer refers to and concurs with Judge 
David H. Anderson’s analogy to national criminal procedure).  See also The 
“Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David H. Anderson, para. 13. 
 154. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer, 
para. 18. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  The French version of 73(2) refers to “une caution ou une garantie 
suffisante.”  Id.  One translation of this phrase is “an adequate bond or secu-
rity” (author’s translation).  This Note does not offer a comprehensive statu-
tory analysis of Articles 73 and 292.  For such an analysis, including how the 
meaning of “reasonable bond” may differ according to the six authentic lan-
guage versions of UNCLOS, see Franckx, supra note 71, at 326–30.  See also 
Oxman & Bantz, supra note 134, at 716–17.  Cf. The “Volga” Case (including 
dissenting opinions of Judges Anderson and Shearer, and the Separate Opin-
ion of Judge Cot). 
 157. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David H. Anderson, 
para. 7.  
 158. Id.  (“Where the Convention does limit the rights of coastal States in 
the matter of enforcement, it does so in express terms: article 73, paragraph 3, 
prohibits imprisonment and corporal punishment.”). 
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curity” probably refers to a financial security,159 the term “bond” 
has both a financial and legal meaning.160  Where Article 73 is 
concerned, “bond” has the legal meaning associated with crimi-
nal procedure, as opposed to a purely financial meaning associ-
ated with investment matters.161  Judge Anderson illustrated his 
point by analogy to the setting of bail bonds under U.S. States 
and English domestic law; both allow the inclusion of condi-
tions.162  Thus, when the Tribunal assesses the reasonableness 
of a given bond, it should examine the reasonableness of three 
elements: the amount, form and conditions of the bond.163  A 
non-financial, “good behaviour bond” with the legitimate pur-
pose of deterring additional poaching by a released vessel would 
therefore constitute a bond within the literal meaning of Article 
73(2).164   
V. ARGUMENTS FAVORING A BROADER INTERPRETATION OF 
ARTICLE 73(2) 
It is too soon to predict the impact the opinions of judges Cot, 
Shearer, and Anderson on future ITLOS prompt release cases.165  
Judge Anderson optimistically suggested that, with the Volga 
case, the Tribunal had “gone further than it did in the Monte 
  
 159. Id. para. 8. 
 160. Id. para. 9.  
 161. Id. para. 10. 
 162. Id. paras. 12–13. 
 163. Id. para. 14. 
 164. Id. para. 20.  Judge Anderson indicates that the use of a “good behav-
iour bond” would be justifiable in the Volga case because the Volga appeared 
likely to re-offend; it apparently ignored warnings issued by Australian au-
thorities and “spent much of the period between its warning and its arrest 
fishing in the CCAMLR Area, including the EEZ.” Id. para. 22(a).  Moreover, 
were the Volga released, “it may well be nigh impossible to keep track of the 
Volga in Antarctic waters, including the Australian EEZ, especially if it is not 
carrying VMS.”  Id. para. 22(e). 
 165. Ryszard Piotrowicz concludes:  
This is an important decision. It shows the potential for a clear divi-
sion in the tribunal with regard to the meaning of reasonable bonds.  
Until now a majority, six out of 11, of the cases before the tribunal, 
have concerned prompt release.  It is therefore very likely that the is-
sue will arise again and soon.  Judges Shearer and Anderson have 
given their colleagues plenty of food . . . for thought. 
Piotrowicz, supra note 145, at 163. 
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Confurco case two years earlier.”166  Whereas in the earlier case 
the Tribunal “simply took note”167 of the detaining state’s con-
cerns over the serious situation caused by IUU fishing, in 
Volga: “[t]he Tribunal understands the international concerns 
about [IUU Fishing] and appreciates the objectives behind the 
measures taken by States, including the States Parties to 
CCAMLR, to handle the problem.”168  But, no matter how under-
standing and appreciative the Tribunal may be, the majority’s 
narrow reasoning does not imply a change of course.  To the 
contrary, the Volga case stalls the creation of a judicial prece-
dent under which coastal states may impose high, deterrent 
penalties and additional, non-financial conditions of release.169   
A. The Impact of Volga on the IUU Fishing of Toothfish 
As the Volga case demonstrates, the Tribunal’s focus is pre-
dominantly procedural with regard to reasonable bond disputes, 
to the detriment of the overall spirit and substance of UNCLOS.  
This undermines coastal states’ ability to deter IUU fishing by 
imposing meaningful financial penalties.170  In the case of tooth-
fish, poachers clearly find it worthwhile to risk typical penal-
  
 166. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David H. Anderson, at 
para. 2. 
 167. Id. 
 168. The “Volga” Case, para. 68.  In the Camouco judgment, which preceded 
the Monte Confurco case by several months, the Tribunal likewise simply 
“[took] note of the gravity of the alleged offences,” without acknowledging IUU 
fishing and efforts to prevent toothfish poaching.  The “Camouco” Case (Pa-
nama v. France), ITLOS case No. 5, para. 68 (2000).  Moreover, the Tribunal 
“failed to reveal precisely how the amount of the bond was determined, [al-
though] the Tribunal did identify the factors it took into account.”  Oxman & 
Bantz, supra note 134, at 720.   In the Grand Prince case, the Tribunal never 
reached a discussion of the gravity of the offense, finding on a separate issue 
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the application.  The “Grand Prince” 
Case (Belize v. France) ITLOS Case No. 8, para. 93 (2001). 
 169. See Gorina-Ysern, supra note 8, at 676–77. 
 170. The risk of excessive, arbitrary, or discriminatory penalties is offset by 
certain UNCLOS provisions. For example, UNCLOS prohibits discrimination 
when setting allowable catch rates and other conservation measures for the 
high seas: “States concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and 
their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the fish-
ermen of any State.” UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 119(3).  
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ties.171  Moreover, after the Volga case, Australia and other 
coastal states might be inclined to refrain from imposing higher 
bonds if the amount, if contested before ITLOS, is likely to be 
struck down.  Finally, if the Tribunal continues to interpret Ar-
ticle 73 in a way that disfavors national and regional conserva-
tion regulations, such as Australian laws and CCAMLR Con-
vention rules, efforts to sustain toothfish populations are likely 
to fail. 
B. Defending the Tribunal’s Approach 
The Tribunal is relatively new.  UNCLOS entered into force 
in November, 1994, and the ITLOS bench was elected in 1996.172  
It handed down its first prompt release decision in 1997, the 
M/V Saiga case.173  In M/V Saiga, the Tribunal set a “low bur-
den” standard for the flag state to meet in order to prevail in its 
application for release.174  This legal standard arguably “does 
violence to the balance the Convention strikes concerning the 
scope of permissible third-party oversight of coastal state activi-
ties in their EEZs, making it too easy to subject coast state de-
tentions of foreign flag vessels to international judicial re-
view.”175   However, the Tribunal may have been justified in 
playing it safe.  Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect a fairly 
new court to “assert bold and innovative interpretations of the 
Convention”; it is understandable that it would “exert its au-
thority only incrementally.”176  Even CCAMLR members have 
expressed deference to ITLOS, despite its rulings on the prompt 
release cases.177  Some scholars, placing a high value on consis-
  
 171. See Swashbuckling Customs, supra note 46; COLTO Media Alert, su-
pra note 46. 
 172. John E. Noyes, Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement: Past, Present, and 
Future, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 301, 303 (1999). 
 173. The “M/V Saiga” Case (Saint Vincent & the Grenadines v. Guinea), 
ITLOS Case. No. 1 (1997), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004).   
 174. See Noyes, supra note 172, at 307.   
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 307–08. 
 177. CCAMLR-XXI Meeting, supra note 91, para. 8.67.  Sweden stated that: 
ITLOS has just begun its work, but it has dealt with several cases 
concerning prompt release of vessels.  If there is a legal development 
within the praxis of the Tribunal in respect of what is to be consid-
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tency and efficiency in jurisprudence, praise the Tribunal’s 
work in prompt release cases for having those attributes.178  Fi-
nally, the Tribunal faces a difficult task.  UNCLOS is difficult 
to interpret and apply because it is “built upon the compromise 
and accommodation of the different interests at stake, and is 
therefore deliberately ambiguous in many respects.”179  
C. Arguments For and Against Amending Article 73(2) of 
UNCLOS 
If we accept the Volga court’s view that the Tribunal is con-
strained from liberally construing the term “reasonable bond,”180 
then perhaps the focus should shift from interpreting the 
Convention to amending it.    
It is possible that the Convention’s drafters foresaw neither 
the vast collapse of fish populations nor the extent to which 
IUU fishing would increase.  During the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea between 1974 and 1982,181  
non-coastal states raised the issue of fishing rights to surplus 
populations living inside the coastal states’ EEZs.  Because they 
debated what to do with surplus fish populations, it appears 
that, at the time, states did not seriously contemplate the po-
tential extinction of these resources.182  Perhaps they did not 
  
ered as a “reasonable bond,” and which praxis is considered to be det-
rimental to efforts to combat illegal fishing, this is something that 
has to be dealt with in the context of ITLOS’ own jurisprudence.  It is 
the view of Sweden that it is important to have confidence [in] the 
UNCLOS system and in the work of the Tribunal. 
Id. 
 178. See Tim Stephens & Donald R. Rothwell, Case Note, The Volga (Rus-
sian Fed’n v. Australia), I.T.L.O.S. No. 11 (Dec. 23, 2002), 35 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 283, 291 (2004) (“The speed and efficiency with which the Tribunal han-
dled this case demonstrates its effectiveness in such cases.  This can only lead 
to further confidence in its ability to address prompt release matters.”).   
Stephens and Rothwell, nevertheless, acknowledge that the Tribunal ap-
peared to ignore the serious and widespread problem of IUU fishing in Aus-
tralia’s EEZ, in violation of Australian fisheries laws and CCAMLR conserva-
tion efforts.  Id. at 288. 
 179. Marcos A. Orellana, The Law on Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: ITLOS 
Jurisprudence in Context, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 459, 462 (2004). 
 180. The “Volga” Case, para. 76. 
 181. JUDA, supra note 58, at 213. 
 182. Id. at 217 (“Should the emphasis of the EEZ regime be on some concept 
of full utilization of resources, requiring that others be allowed to fish in those 
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envisage advances in fishing technology that would facilitate 
IUU fishing.183  Had they foreseen today’s decline in some living 
marine resources, the UNCLOS drafters might have modified 
Article 73 to unambiguously allow coastal states greater discre-
tion to deter IUU Fishing within their EEZs.  Perhaps, too, the 
drafters did not anticipate the high cost to coastal states of 
monitoring and patrolling EEZs,184 which now justifies demand-
ing high bonds in exchange for the release of rogue vessels. 
UNCLOS provides procedures for amending the Conven-
tion.185  At the Twenty-First Meeting of CCAMLR in 2002, 
members debated the pros and cons of amending Article 73(2).186  
Australia submitted a proposal to amend Article 73(2) to ex-
empt vessels that were detained for IUU fishing in the 
CCAMLR Convention Area.187  This would prevent such vessels 
from re-offending after posting bond188 pending the resolution of 
litigation on the merits.   
The response to Australia’s proposal was decidedly luke-
warm.  Several participating countries expressed concern that 
the amendment procedure would be protracted and compli-
cated.189  France worried that it might entail the inconvenience 
of “having to appear before the tribunal in Hamburg, Ger-
many.”190  The United Kingdom tempered its sympathy for the 
Australian initiative with doubts that the proposed amendment 
  
instances in which the coastal state could not utilize all of the available 
catch….”). 
 183. According to Earle,  
In the decade since the 1982 convention, advances in fishing technol-
ogy, from the deployment of thousands of miles of lightweight, inex-
pensive drift nets to the use of sophisticated sonar and even satellite 
observation techniques to locate populations of fish and squid, have 
led to swift and devastating reductions in what once seemed to be 
“limitless” populations.   
EARLE, supra note 1, at 162. 
 184. The “Volga” Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, at para. 9.  
 185. UNCLOS, supra note 8, arts. 311-16.  Prior to submitting a proposed 
amendment, a period of  ten years from the date of entry into force must ex-
pire.  UNCLOS entered into force in November, 1994, therefore this ten-year 
period has recently expired.   
 186. CCAMLR-XXI Meeting, supra note 91, paras. 8.62–.73. 
 187. Id. para. 8.62. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. paras. 8.63, 8.66, 8.71.   
 190. Id. para. 8.71. 
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would fix the problem.191  If Article 73(2) were eliminated, a 
coastal state would no longer be obligated to release a vessel on 
bond, which could have consequences for the detaining state if 
the Tribunal later determined that the vessel was not guilty of 
IUU fishing; the detaining state might have to pay considerable 
compensation for keeping the boat in port.192  The United King-
dom was also concerned that such an amendment might be con-
trary to the object and purpose of the Convention, namely to 
“strik[e] a  very careful balance between the rights of Coastal 
States and the rights of fishing states, and Article 72(3) is part 
of that balance.”193   
Other states endorsed the United Kingdom’s “cautious” ap-
proach,194 articulating conservative or passive positions.  Swe-
den, commenting that UNCLOS “is a package deal,”195 which 
balances the rights of flag states and coastal states, concluded 
that there is too great a risk of disturbing the balance by 
amending Article 73.196  Neither Sweden nor the United King-
dom wished to second-guess or offend ITLOS.197  Chile suggested 
that, rather than amend UNCLOS, “if ITLOS decisions contin-
ued to constitute a cause for concern, the matter could be raised 
in other forums, such as the U.N. Oceans Consultation, 
UNCLOS Parties Meeting, or as intervening States at ITLOS 
proceedings.”198   France found the proposed amendment “dis-
proportionate in relation to the problem” without further expla-
nation.199 
  
 191. Id. para. 8.64. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. paras. 8.62–.73. 
 195. Id. para. 8.67. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. para. 8.64 (“We also think it may send the wrong message as to our 
faith in [ITLOS], an institution set up by UNCLOS.  If States think ITLOS is 
taking the wrong approach, the correct place to raise that issue is within the 
tribunal.”).  See also id. para. 8.67 (“It is the view of Sweden that it is impor-
tant to have confidence in the UNCLOS system and in the work of the Tribu-
nal.”). 
 198. Id. para. 8.65. 
 199. Id. para. 8.71. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Tribunal and CCAMLR should revisit the idea of amend-
ing Article 73(2) in greater depth and provide coastal states 
with specific, alternative solutions before Patagonian toothfish 
are both off our dinner plates and gone from the oceans.200  At 
the very least, an in-depth assessment of Australia’s proposed 
amendment is in order.  Perhaps there is a way to amend Arti-
cle 73(2) without completely abolishing it.  This Note proposes a 
less drastic revision.  For example, Article 73(2) could be 
amended to unambiguously permit additional, non-financial 
conditions of release, provided they are reasonable under the 
facts of a given conflict.  Further, the amendment could permit 
higher financial bonds or securities in the case of repeat offend-
ers or large-scale IUU fishing operators.  
CCAMLR should, at the very least, investigate Chile’s alter-
native suggestions, or devise others.  Pending an amendment or 
other international solutions, Australia has increased domestic 
fines for illegal foreign fishers201 and taken the bold step of send-
ing an armed ship to patrol its waters to deter toothfish poach-
ers.202  Meanwhile, it remains to be seen how ITLOS will app- 
  
 200. It is not the purpose of this Note to assess CCAMLR’s efficacy.  How-
ever, for criticism of this organization, see generally BLACK MARKET WHITE 
GOLD, supra note 15; Media Release, Australian Toothfish Industry Slam 
International Meeting Outcomes, COLTO, Nov. 13, 2004, available at 
http://www.colto.org/TFIndustry_MR_13_November03.htm (last visited Nov. 
18, 2004); Popick, supra note 19, at 961–85; CCAMLR: The Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Greenpeace International,  
at http://archive.greenpeace.org/oceans/southernoceans/expedition2000/morein 
fo/bg_ccamlr.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004). 
 201. Australia Boosts Fines for Illegal Foreign Fishers, AlertNet, REUTERS 
FOUNDATION, Nov. 26, 2003, available at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/ 
newsdesk/SYD68601.htm (“The proposed new laws would also allow the Aus-
tralian government to recover the cost of pursuit and apprehension of foreign 
illegal fishing vessels.”). 
 202. Australia Arms Toothfish Patrol, BBC News, supra note 14. 
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roach its next prompt release judgment.  By then, sadly, it may 
be too late for the toothfish. 
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